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THE COMPLEX INTERPLAY OF EU-CHINA AND EU-HKSAR RELATIONS
Antonia Gough
Maastricht University
Email: a.gough@student.maastrichtuniversity.nl
Abstrak
Sejarah kolonial yang unik membuat Hong Kong menjalankan sistem kebijakan “Satu Negara,
Dua Sistem Pemerintahan”. Pada masa awal Hong Kong dikembalikan, sistem kebijakan
tersebut tidak menimbulkan masalah berarti. Namun, dalam beberapa tahun belakangan, sistem
kebijakan “Satu Negara, Dua Sistem Pemerintahan” mulai menuai ketegangan diantaranya
terkait dengan Gerakan Payung 2014, penahanan mahasiswa yang melakukan demonstrasi, dan
rangkaian insiden penting seperti hilangnya lima orang penerbit buku. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk
mengungkap konsistensi Uni Eropa mempromosikan norma demokrasi dalam hubungannya
dengan HKSAR. Dengan mengunakan teknik analisa wacana pada dokumen Uni Eropa yang
relevan, artikel ini membahas dua hal. Pertama, menyelidiki apakah ketegangan yang terjadi
mengarah pada kemungkinan sikap ke(tidak)konsistensian ujaran Uni Eropa dan bagaimana
sebenarnya tindakannya mengenai perselisihan antara Hong Kong dan China. Kedua,
menganalisa konsistensi wacana Uni Eropa yang sebagian besar menekankan promosi nilai dan
norma demokrasi.

Kata kunci:
Hubungan Uni Eropa-China, "Satu Negara, Dua Sistem", kebijakan luar negeri, wacana, hak
pilih universal, hak asasi manusia

Abstract
Due to a unique colonial history, Hong Kong today operates under the “One Country, Two
Systems” framework. In the years immediately following the handover, it was generally thought
that this was working quite well. In recent years, however, tensions have arisen within the “One
Country, Two Systems” model, most notably including the 2014 Umbrella Movement, the
imprisonment of student protesters and various notable incidents like the disappearance of five
book publishers. This article aims to uncover how consistent the EU is in promoting democratic
norms in its relations with the HKSAR. Using discourse analysis of relevant EU documents, the
article explores two things. Firstly, to investigate whether these tensions lead to potential
(in)consistencies between what the EU says and how it in fact acts regarding disputes between
Hong Kong and China. Secondly, since a large part of EU discourse stresses the promotion of
values and norms such as democracy, this article analyses the consistency of this discourse.

Keywords:
EU-China relations, “One Country, Two Systems”, foreign policy, discourse, universal suffrage,
human rights
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INTRODUCTION
“What are we for, what do we believe, what are we prepared to do? … Do we have in
Europe any remaining value-driven vision of the world?”
(Patten,1998)

These words of former Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten,
highlight the common criticism towards the European Union (EU) and its foreign policy.
Scholars accuse the EU of pursuing an incoherent and inconsistent foreign policy (Risse&
Babayan, 2015; Smith, 2001; Youngs, 2009). There is also much discussion on what kind
of power the EU is, whether it is a civilian, normative or even imperialist power
(Andreatta& Zambernardi, 2017). However, these discussions of what sort of actor it is
begin to matter less if the EU cannot be viewed as consistent in the first place.
Acting coherently is especially important when looking at relations with the
world’s second largest economic power, China. It remains uncertain if Patten had China
on his mind when he said the above words, but he may well have, as he was the last
Governor of Hong Kong (HK) before it returned to Chinese control after 156 years of
British rule. However, his quote points to the crux of the issue this article seeks to explore.
EU-China relations are a salient topic of research, not only in terms of trade and
security, but also in terms of democracy and human rights promotion. According to the
Commission, the EU must project a “strong, clear and unified voice” in its approach to
China (2016, p.4). The document also states “The EU’s external action is governed by
the principles which have inspired its own creation: democracy, the rule of law and human
rights”. The aspect of EU-China relations this article focuses on is whether the potential
uneasy coexistence between normative concerns and material interests of the EU in China
(Christiansen, Kirchner& Murray, 2015) impacts or not on the EU’s consistency as a
foreign policy actor in this region.
The focus on HK as a narrower case study within EU-China relations is this
paper’s chosen response to the wider puzzle of consistency and coherence of EU foreign
policy (EFP) in China. On the one hand, analysing HK as a case may provide the final
nail in the coffin, as it were, in terms of concluding once and for all that the EU is an
inherently inconsistent actor. On the other hand, whilst there seems to exist an extensive
consensus on the EU’s disappointing track record in foreign policy consistency, HK’s
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ever-increasing strategic importance to the EU may reveal itself to be enough to
incentivise the EU to act more in line with its stated foreign policy aspirations.
A brief history is necessary to demonstrate why and how HK has evolved to be
different to mainland China in certain ways. After being under British rule, HK was
returned to mainland China after the signing of the Sino-British Declaration and
launching of the Hong Kong Basic Law in 1997. Under the principle of “One Country,
Two Systems”, it was agreed between the Chinese and the British that HK would retain
a high degree of autonomy in all matters except defence and foreign policy. This situation
will remain until 2047, marking the year HK completes its transition to becoming an
integrated part of the PRC, when its present constitutional arrangements will expire.
HK’s “semi-democratic” (Burns, 2017) political system survived the transition
mostly unchanged. This has allowed the EU to gradually develop mature, broad and indepth relations with HK. In recent years, however, tensions have arisen within the One
Country, Two Systems model, peaking during the 2014 Umbrella Movement (part of the
wider democratic movement, Occupy Central).
Thus, the article explores two things. Firstly, to investigate whether these tensions
lead to potential (in)consistencies between what the EU says and how it in fact acts
regarding disputes between HK and China. Secondly, since a large part of EU discourse
stresses the promotion of values and norms such as democracy, this article analyses the
consistency of this discourse. In particular, the “more talk and less action” debate
surrounding EU democracy promotion in HK makes it relevant to understand this more
in-depth. Analysing these two elements of consistency will contribute more broadly to
uncovering possible tensions between, on the one hand, actual EFP and on the other, its
aspirations towards a value-based foreign policy more generally,
Therefore, the research question posed is: How consistent is the EU in promoting
democratic norms in its relations with the HKSAR? A discourse analysis of various EU
documents, debates and speeches is done to answer this. This article argues that, despite
a scholarly consensus that the result should be otherwise, the EU achieves high levels of
consistency both in terms of discourse and in terms of actions in its foreign policy towards
HK.
This research is important as, whilst there is an established debate on the strengths
and flaws of EFP, little has been written about EU-HK foreign policy specifically. This
article makes a step towards filling this gap. An important purpose of the research is to
better uncover the Union’s approach to a city that is not only becoming an increasingly
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vital region to the EU, but as a case study that can help contribute to the broader debates
on relations between HK’s “mother”, China, and the EU. Finally, research on “valuebased” foreign policy has societal relevance because foreign policy making has to be open
to scrutiny to ensure actors are living up to their own standards they set themselves. This
is especially important for the EU, a body that increasingly sees itself as a global actor
and external governor. All these reasons make this a fascinating object of analysis and
research well worth pursuing.
The structure of this article proceeds as follows. Initially a short state of the art is
outlined, followed by the analytical framework, including an explanation and justification
of the chosen conceptual framework and also of the methodology I undertake. What
follows is an analysis of both the levels of discursive consistency in terms of two factors,
time and institutions, and of consistency between words and actions. Lastly, concluding
statements are made.

EU foreign policy towards third countries - plagued by double standards?
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is necessary to outline the state of the art,
followed by the conceptual framework and the methodology derived from this. Some
literature focuses on the quality of EFP concerning democratic norm promotion more
generally, whilst other literature focuses more specifically on the relationship between
the EU and China, or the EU and HK, in this sphere. There are several common themes
that emerge, all relevant to this study.
The first theme is that the EU has recently made efforts to transition from a
continental to a global actor (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Lucarelli, 2006; Youngs, 2009). This
discussion is important to this research because it helps justify the choice of research
puzzle and chosen concepts to be measured.
The second theme, most important for this research, is inconsistency. The general
scholarly consensus is that the EU is lacking consistency in its foreign policy and external
action, which leads to shortcomings in its overall strategic approach (Ferreira-Pereira,
2010; Risse & Babayan, 2015; Smith, 2001; Youngs, 2009). Risse and Babayan (2015)
argue the EU needs to better match their words and deeds, to walk the walk, as it were,
otherwise they lose credibility and the target’s reliance on them is harmed. Smith (2001)
goes as far as to argue that the EU does not have a foreign policy because this is a divided
competence with Member States (MS) and that the way the EU makes foreign policy is
an obstacle to its achievement of a consistent approach to human rights. Even though it
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appears this debate is not a hugely contentious one, it is important not to go into the
analysis assuming that finding inconsistency will be self-evident.
Four potential explanations appear as for why this inconsistency may exist. The
first is that the EU is “flexible” in how strongly it pushes for these principles depending
on the other actor involved, their strategic importance and the EU’s other interests
(Lucarelli, 2006). Essentially, the EU is not always able or willing to extend its norms to
third countries. It will be interesting to see if I draw similar conclusions.
The second explanation is what Börzel (2015) terms the “democratisation- stability
dilemma”. It suggests the more unstable a country is and hence the greater impact
democratisation would have, the less likely EU democracy promotion is to be effective.
HK is specifically discussed by Börzel (2015), who argues China is too important to the
EU for it to openly support HK in their quest for democratisation. She hypoarticlees that
Western democracy promoters only react to non-democratic regional powers if they
prioritise human rights and democracy ahead of stability and security (Börzel, 2015).
Thus, she concludes that it is “unclear” how far and how actively the EU attempts to
promote democracy in HK. This idea of the EU not being unequivocally committed to
HRD promotion, preferring to pursue stability over democracy, is shared by other
scholars (Risse& Babayan, 2015; Panebianco, 2006; Smith, 2014; Youngs, 2009). This
argument will be kept in mind whilst undertaking the discourse analysis.
For Risse and Babayan (2015), the impact of EU democracy promotion is
conditioned by economic and security links between and among the three actors (in this
case the EU, China and HK) and by external actors’ leverage (the EU and China) on the
domestic forces (HK). Panebianco (2006) mirrors these authors’ feelings in believing
security concerns are often what guides foreign policy. She goes further than others,
though, in being reluctant to term EFP as “valued” at all because of the role security plays
in its formation. For her, this security-value axis demonstrates the inconsistencies of such
policy that the EU must attempt to overcome when trying to export a culturally derived
concept of human rights, something not as universal as it may appear (Panebianco, 2006).
Youngs (2009) is slightly less pessimistic in concluding that although strategic concerns
have never completely stalled or superseded the EU’s democratisation agenda in China,
the EU has also not driven this agenda forward in a comprehensive or coherent way.
Youngs’s (2009) perceives democracy promotion as being handled as a separate policy
domain rather than one conditioning and informing other objectives, treated more as an
“add on” rather than as an essential underpinning informing other policy decisions.
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The third explanation for inconsistency takes a different stance and implies MS
exclusively seek national interests in EFP, prohibiting an overall ability to act effectively
and consistently on a common EU-level ((Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Cameron, 2009; Rees,
2009; Smith, 2014; Youngs, 2009). Christiansen et al (2015) argue the EU is not a
coherent actor in Asia because of the fact bilateral trade relations take precedence. MS
continue to carry out a national policy towards China, the three biggest MS (Germany,
the UK and France) being the worst offenders (2015). They go even further in arguing
that, compared to the EU institutions, such MS give less priority to observing the rule of
law and human rights on the continent.
The fourth explanation relates to the idea certain EU institutions may take more
explicit stances on normative foreign policy issues than others, the European Parliament
(Parliament) often being seen as the most vocal (Cameron, 2009; Balme, 2008; Shen,
2015). Related to this, Youngs (2009) questions whether it is the EU’s structure which
most weakens its capacity to engage in purposive and coordinated action abroad, but
eventually concludes this is not the main explanation. This institutional aspect is an object
of analysis later in the paper.
Not all relevant literature takes the EU as the subject. Many authors take China as
the focus. Chen and Kinzelbach (2015) analyse whether or not China is able to stifle EU
and US efforts at democracy promotion. They conclude that China can do this when it
wishes to. They further argue that the support the EU has shown to HK has been limited
and conclude that the EU and the US tend to respect any red lines Beijing has, reluctant
to burden their relations with China in the name of democracy. By extension, Chen and
Kinzelbach (2015) argue activists cannot rely on resolute international support, echoing
earlier arguments.
There are gaps in the literature this research can fill. There is a wealth of literature
on HK’s current “predicament” (Lee, 2017; Ortmann, 2015; Ortmann, 2016; Zhang,
2010) and more generally on the development of EU-China relations (Caira, 2010;
Cameron, 2015; Christiansen et al, 2015; Taneja, Wilson& Wiessala, 2009), yet next to
nothing has been written combining the many elements covered by this state of the art
and furthermore applying them in the context of EU-HK relations. Thus, this article aims
to contribute by bringing together the various issues identified in the literature review in
order to answer the research question.
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
After providing a review of the literature to identify the significant issues within
this area of research, this chapter presents the conceptual framework. Social
constructivism is the conceptual lens chosen through which to interpret this research.
Social constructivism holds the view that the “building blocks of international reality are
ideational as well as material and that ideational factors have normative as well as
instrumental dimensions” (Ruggie as cited in Christiansen, Jorgensen& Wiener, 1999).
Social constructivists believe concepts and beliefs are significant in shaping interstate
action.
In addition, concepts and beliefs can convey values and norms an actor perceives
as important and appropriate in the global context, for example democracy promotion
worldwide. The identity of an agent has an impact on their beliefs about the nature of the
world and what works within it. Essentially, this concept sheds light on the impact of
norms and ideas on the construction of identities and behaviours. Consequently, concepts
and beliefs can be well-applied to the case at hand, considering how the EU’s selfperception affects their relationship towards other actors, such as China or HK. Thus, this
will be borne in mind throughout the analysis.
Although much literature believes EFP to be driven by security, economic and
other strategic interests, social constructivism is one of the most appropriate conceptual
frameworks for the analysis of EU-HK relations. This research focuses on whether values
can be and are still present in EFP towards HK when confronted with an illiberal actor
such as China. Furthermore, other authors have successfully applied social constructivism
to the study of EU external relations and foreign policy (Geeraerts,2006; Aydin-Düzgit,
2015), proving it is well equipped to enable new insights in this research. The EU is itself
a social construction, promoting values and norms such as democracy, freedom and the
rule of law, to create an identity and perception of itself as a normative power. This is
especially the case regarding how the EU sees itself as a democracy promoter in its
external action, a role where identity construction plays a vital part.
In this research’s context, “democratic norms” are defined to encompass both the
promotion and protection of human rights, the rule of law, democracy and other related
fundamental civic rights. “Democracy” is a contested, fluid and context dependent
concept. Thus, “democratisation” is defined in the specific and unique context of HK. HK
people enjoy some democratic elements. However, the only elections with true universal
suffrage are in District Council elections and for only one half of the Legislative Council
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(the other half are functional seats, elected by a specific sector of the population). The
Chief Executive is elected by an electoral college.
Thus, when protesting in late 2014 for “democracy”, what the HK people were
pursuing was the chance to directly elect their head of government from a list of
candidates not hand-picked by the Beijing government. The not so democratic element of
having just under half the legislature chosen by an exclusive subset of the potential
electorate took a back seat in the 2014 protests, yet is another key democratic deficiency
nonetheless. These various (admittedly complex) elements are what is meant by
“democratisation” whenever it is alluded to in the context of this research.
A further important element to keep in mind is that in the HK case, a key element of their
struggle is the preservation of the norms, values and freedoms they currently have. While
many still strive for the ultimate goal of universal suffrage, many citizens see their efforts
as being most efficiently directed towards trying simply to maintain the political and legal
status quo in terms of personal autonomy, without allowing this to decrease any further.

METHODOLOGY
In light of the conceptual framework, it is now possible to outline the
methodology.
Case Selection
This research concerns the single, intrinsic case study of HK. HK is an important
case to analyse because of its unusual present position, and because of its “uniqueness as
an entity” (European Commission, 1997, p.1). As a semi-autonomous region, it is not a
country, but can be interpreted as many contrasting things, depending on the viewer’s
stance. For example, many view HK as a global city, a gateway between Asia and the rest
of the world. Simultaneously, others (such as the Chinese government) understand it to
be on the same administrative level as a Chinese province. In objective, legal terms, it is
neither fully sovereign nor fully under Beijing’s rule (at present).
Whilst research may have been conducted on the EU’s relations with other postcolonial nation-states, HK is special in its status as being relatively newly “decolonised”
(or as some go as far as to argue, “recolonised”) and thus requires further research. The
only other SAR existing in China is Macau, which would have also been a valid case
choice. However, HK is more pertinent for two reasons. Firstly, relations are more
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established with HK than with Macau. Secondly, HK had the interesting development of
the Umbrella Movement, something Macau did not.
The specificity of HK as a case limits the capacity of this article to generalise the
findings to other countries, as in only assessing one case I face the “small n” problem.
However, the benefits of choosing HK outweigh the limitations posed by the “small-n”
issue. Results could be used in wider application of other “sham” democracies the EU is
involved in. Furthermore, research here makes a valuable contribution to, and speaks to
the wider issue of, EU-China relations. By better understanding how consistent the EU is
in its foreign policy approach to HK, we can better understand the EU’s foreign policy
approach to China. The findings may in the future be applied to other similar cases within
the China context such as Taiwan or Macau.
The time period covered is 1997 to today, this start point being chosen as it marked
a transition in HK’s political system. Choosing the present day as the end point, despite
running the risk of trying to analyse a “moving target”, is appropriate because of key
events having been so recent. Developments in the city are constantly evolving. Within
an EU context, this time period is also interesting to analyse as many developments have
occurred in the field of EU external action, such as the implementation of the Lisbon
Treaty which created the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2011.
Data Collection And Method
Discourse analysis is the method of analysis employed. In order to select the
sources for analysis, the EurLex database was searched, using the terms “Hong Kong”,
“China” and “One Country, Two Systems” to retrieve all annual reports and other related
documents, such as the Parliament resolutions, Commission communications and Council
declarations. In addition, the websites of the EEAS and the EU Office in HK were
searched for relevant speeches and press releases, and the relevant Parliament debate
transcripts found. A total of 3 debates and 40 documents was analysed, 19 of which are
the annual reports. A variety of documents were analysed to provide a wider spectrum of
EU discourse.
An

eclectic

combination

of

provisional,

holistic,

descriptive,

simultaneous, umbrella and value coding were applied to the qualitative data. Various
cycles of coding occurred. The literature that guided the analytic process were Gee’s How
to do Discourse Analysis: a Toolkit (2011) and Salda a’s Coding Manual for Qualitative
Researchers (2016). First, the documents relevant to each institution were analysed to
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ascertain if there were differences in discourse between the four institutions (the Council,
the Parliament, the Commission and the EEAS). Then, the annual reports were analysed
to see if the discourse has altered over the last two decades. Manual coding was used
throughout.
Discourse analysis is an appropriate method to analyse EFP because this method
is committed to a strong social constructivist view in the way it explores the relationships
between text, discourse and context. A further justification of the method is that discourse
conveys norms, values, attitudes, motivations or identities that shape EFP. This makes
discourse and the norms contained within it an independent variable explaining (at least
partly) foreign policy outcomes (Diez, 2014). The research puzzle is one where central
aspects include both the wider context of complex geopolitical relations and also
analysing an actor that “talks” a lot, speaking and writing making up a considerable part
of the EU’s action. Making statements, speeches and resolutions is one key tool the EU
has in foreign policy. This is one reason the discourse analysis literature in the field of
EFP has grown in line with the recent developments in the EU’s increased role as a global
actor.
Before beginning the document analysis, their context was considered. Then, a
preliminary list of codes was compiled, refined throughout the analysis and resulting in
45 codes. From an in-depth analysis of the texts, various discourse strands were identified,
analysed below.
Consistency As A Measurement
The article aims to measure the consistency of the EU’s foreign policy towards
HK. To measure this in the most concrete, empirical way possible, the level of four
different areas of consistency are ascertained. Before outlining how this is done, what is
not going to be measured is explained.
There are many terms that have similar, overlapping or related meanings to
consistency, such as coherence, actorness, effectiveness and legitimacy. Yet, these are
not concepts this article has an interest in. The key idea being measured is consistency whether the EU practices what it preaches.
Consistency across institutions is the first to be measured. This characteristic is worth
evaluating because the EU’s institutional structure and the institutions themselves make
up a vital part of the EU’s actorness and any related (in)consistency. An additional
justification is that the literature has alluded to potential elements of non-uniformity in
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this area. This is measured by undertaking a discourse analysis of the text of various
institutional documents, such as Commission communications, declarations by the
Council Presidency, speeches given by various EU representatives and press releases
from across institutions.
The second kind of consistency examined is consistency over time. This is an
appropriate form to measure because an important aspect of the wider research puzzle is
this idea of China’s gradual rise in influence for both the EU and HK. Thus, it makes
sense to examine any alterations in the EU’s discourse over the years. The fact there are
annual Commission reports as a concrete and substantial form of analysis to compare
further justifies this measurement. Consistency across time is measured by applying
discourse analysis to text used in annual Commission reports on the EU-HK relationship,
starting from 1998 to the most recent, in 2017. I will firstly analyse the discourse strands
that appear and whether these consistently reappear or are more evolutionary, and
secondly will see if the EU follows through on promises it makes.
A third type of consistency that could have been analysed is consistency across
MS. However, this has been avoided for two reasons. Firstly, not all 28 MS can be studied,
so a case selection would have to be made, with many options available. Secondly, the
overwhelming opinion in the literature is that MS have diverging foreign policy
objectives anyway, thus the analytical contribution could end up being small, the eventual
conclusions already somewhat predictable. It is preferred to focus on fewer elements in
greater detail instead.

DISCUSSIONS
The analysis is split into four sections. The first section evaluates consistency
across institutions. The second section investigates consistency across time. The third
section examines consistency across both time and institutions. The final section analyses
consistency between words and actions.
Before beginning the analysis, an explanation of the rationale behind EU HRD
policy is beneficial. The rationale behind the EU’s democracy promotion is based on a
combination of factors, including a desire to foster identity derived normative interests as
well as more traditional security and economic goals. Within the EU treaties, various
values are referred to as being essential to the EU’s actorness.
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It is essential to consider why inconsistency is negative at all. Inconsistency can
end up “exposing” the EU’s true priorities. Secondly, inconsistencies can undermine the
international profile the EU has attempted to construct, making its commitments less
credible and leaving it open to accusations of hypocrisy and double standards.
Inconsistency acts as a big setback to the EU’s self-portrayal as a principled actor.
Christiansen et al (2015) argue inconsistency threatens their credibility as a normative
power. Furthermore, the recent creation of the EEAS had the explicit aim of helping
strengthen the EU’s presence globally and to enable it to “project its values and interests
more efficiently” (EEAS, 2016). The Treaty on European Union (TEU) in fact states that
the EU shall ensure consistency in its external action. (TEU, Article 21(3)).
Consistency Across The Institutions
The first element of consistency to be ascertained is across institutions. A key
finding was in terms of the language used, and therefore sense of commitment to the
cause. Whilst the EEAS, Council and Commission did all state commitment to HK’s
democratic development, the Parliament’s tone exhibits clear differences. The verbs and
adjectives used by Parliament consistently were more direct, robust and outspoken in
nature, the best examples being “deplore”, “repudiate”, “staunch defender”, and “must”.
These are words the other institutions never use in their discourse, or only start using in
recent years.
Some of the strongest evidence for discursive inconsistency between the
institutions is found in the three parliamentary debates held on HK. As evidence of the
Parliament’s discursive difference when compared with the other institutions, numerous
discourse strands appear in the debates that do not ever occur elsewhere in EU discourse.
There were nine such key discourse strands identified.
The first is criticism of EU inaction on HK, expressing the feeling the EU has not
done enough. Many members expressed open regret at the EU’s silence on HK during the
protests. For example, MEP Marietje Schaake says
From Ashton’s side it has been too quiet. From the Council’s side it has been too quiet.
From Juncker ... we expect more ... It is clear that this House is now the one that will
have to push for external action based on values, otherwise the EU will be irrelevant.

Indeed, there were no Council declarations or EP resolutions published during the
protests or in their aftermath.
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A second differing discursive strand that emerged was a more demanding, direct
approach towards the HK and Chinese governments. The Parliament is more likely to
specify ways the HK government must change its approach and to request for the Chinese
government to act. Parliament are the only institution whose discourse occasionally
speaks negatively about China. Furthermore, whilst the Commission and Council
documents call on the HK Government to make sure the rule of law and various freedoms
are maintained, the Parliament calls on China to ensure these within the context of an HK
related parliamentary debate.
A third interesting discourse that emerged is that the EU is discussing the wrong
subject, that there should not be discussions on the situation in HK but on the bigger
picture of trying to install democracy in China. Certain MEPs are openly scathing of the
EU’s approach towards HK and China. Nowhere in the other institutions’ discourse does
any mention of supporting democracy in China emerge.
A fourth way the Parliament’s discourse differs is in how they use intertextuality,
the process of texts referring to other texts through reference to similar themes, events
and the transfer of arguments to reinforce a discourse. Interestingly, reference is made to
Tiananmen Square by MEPs, an event never referred to in other institutions’ discourses.
This is arguably evidence of a braver institution not scared to make reference to an event
the Chinese government ignores.
A fifth related discursive difference is how none of the documents or diplomatic
speeches of other institutions ever refer to China in terms of its political system, yet MEPs
call China out as being authoritarian. Thus, there is inconsistency in terms of how the
institutions categorise, identify and deal with China.
A sixth new discourse strand that appears often in the debates, but is virtually
absent from the Commission reports, is the importance of tackling HK’s economic
inequality alongside and ideally before the democratisation process. Any discussion of
social issues and linking these to democratisation is completely absent from the discourse
of the Council, EEAS or Commission.
Furthermore, it is only in the debates that mention is made of the EU’s approach
to HK and China as having a negative impact on its image as a global actor. MEP Fredrick
Federley says
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If we do not speak up when fundamental democratic principles are manipulated, then we
also send another type of message: we tell those students that democracy is important for
us... but we do not really care if other people live in a democratic society or not.

A further, related, discourse that emerges from MEPs but does not appear
elsewhere is the idea the EU must rethink its entire foreign policy towards China and
more generally that the EU should choose which countries to partner with not just in terms
of size but also values. This argument is nowhere to be seen in the discourse of other
institutions.
A final contrasting discourse that appears in these debates is that the EU is in
solidarity with the HK people and has sympathy for them. Such a strong expression of
support does not appear in the Commission reports or Council Declarations. The closest
they get is by giving offers of “strong support”. Other institutions’ discourse concerns
support more for the democratisation process itself rather than for the people’s wellbeing.
Despite many inconsistencies in discourse, some consistency can be found. One
consistency between the Parliament’s discourse and the Commission’s is repeated
reference to encouragement of, and a faith in, dialogue and debate as a way to improve
the political situation, a recurring discourse strand in the annual Commission reports and
came up in Parliament resolutions and debates.
In addition, the same key discourse strands that have appeared in the annual
reports (discussed in more detail in the next chapter) appear in the Parliamentary debates
as well. These include: the desire universal suffrage be achieved; that it is the people’s
wish to have universal suffrage; and that HK has managed to foster characteristics of a
free society that should be maintained. This shows consistency across institutions in terms
of subjects of discourse.
An example of consistency is how hopeful their discourses are that peaceful
agreement could be found during the protests and that progress on electoral reform can
occur. Individual MEPs’ discourse is hopeful, many expressing not only hope the
situation will be resolved but also a belief it will. Expressions of hope and optimism in
the Commission reports are also present, but fluctuate as time progresses, discussed later.
When an analysis of the frequency of positive terms versus negative terms appearing
across documents was conducted, generally the Commission and the EEAS present the
situation in an overall optimistic way. Speeches by EEAS officials are consistently highly
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positive in outlook as it is their prerogative to present EU-HK relations as positively as
possible.
The following section shows that there is a gradual shift in how pessimistic and
critical the EU is of the political and legal situation in HK. Yet, even in the earlier years,
the Parliament’s language is more critical, outspoken, stern and committed. Thus,
institutionally speaking, despite some consistency, discourses show some considerable
inconsistencies. However, all EU produced documents, irrespective of institutions, use a
variety of discursive tools to create an appearance of consistency, an important tool
returned to later.
Consistency Across Time
For measuring this type, annual Commission reports were analysed. Indeed, the
very nature of this data reproduces the idea of consistency, in the way they are published
annually, are structured in a similar way and make use of similar discourses year on year.
Certain discourses are even republished word for word, making it hard to argue, from a
discursive point of view at least, the EU has been anything but consistent.
However, not only does the EU give an impression of consistency (a finding
discussed later), but it also is consistent in terms of the discourses it produces yearly.
Some examples of discourse strands remaining consistent across time are: that the
judiciary has remained independent; the media free; that corruption is rare; that freedom
of speech and association have continued; that HK people want, and are ready for,
democracy; and that the continuation of One Country, Two Systems means HK remains
stable and prosperous.
One way the discourse can be seen to have gradually evolved across all
institutions, as a reflection of changing circumstances, is that universal suffrage becomes
more strongly defended over time. Whereas in the early years after the handover, the
discourse was just that universal suffrage is supported by the EU, this has changed to
saying universal suffrage should be encouraged because it is beneficial for various
reasons. In latter documents, the EU also has become more likely to make specific
reference to alarming events and more openly to acknowledge that one Country, Two
Systems is having more pressure put on it.
A further example of discourse in flux is in terms of the level of optimism. The
annual reports up to 2003 were optimistic in tone. This changed in 2004 as a result of the
Article 23 event. But optimism levels rose again after this and remained positive until
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2014 when the Umbrella Movement occurred, becoming even more negative in 2015 and
remaining so to the present.
A shift in discourse from 2014
The 2014 report showed a notable alteration in discourse, a result of the 2014
Occupy Protests. One example of discourse shift was, for the first time in a report, indeed
in any documents across the institutions, HK and the EU’s relationship was discussed in
political terms. The otherwise very consistent norm was for their relationship to
predominantly be discussed in terms of economics, people-to-people exchange and trade.
Throughout the report, there are discourse strands introduced that have not appeared
before, such as the acknowledgement One Country, Two Systems is facing
challenges. In general, this report’s discourse has more explicit language, the EU really
spelling out why universal suffrage is necessary for HK and that the EU is more
supportive of One Country, Two Systems than ever before.
An important new discourse strand to appear was more concrete commitment by
the EU to cooperate on issues relating to electoral reform. The EU goes as far as to offer
sharing their practical experience in democratic development, a step forward in
commitment from the usual declaratory statements. Previously, cooperation had never
been discussed in terms of this policy area. The report was also longer, providing more
space to issues related to democratic norms.
Even a year after the protests, the EU’s tone remained more negative due to the
disappearance of five booksellers, with more new discourses emerging in the 2015 report.
These included: that the EU regrets the lack of progress; that the functioning of One
Country, Two Systems was for the first time called into “serious doubt”. It is also the first
report in which the Commission calls on the Chinese and HK government to act. In this
sense, the critical tone taken echoes the discourses of the Parliament. In general, the
report’s wording was more pessimistic and critical than previous years.
The changing discourse continued to develop in 2016, with the addition for the
first time in the report early on of not only reference to several worrying events but also
to people's anxiety at the prospect of 2047 approaching. Yet, immediately after this, the
consistent discourses return - that despite certain challenges and issues, freedoms remain
and One Country, Two Systems continues.
In the most recent report, more new discourses emerged, most notably the
acknowledgement that a gradual erosion of freedoms in HK has caused “legitimate
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questions” to be raised about HK's long term autonomy. Also, freedom of the press was
called more into question this year, self-censorship being discussed in-depth.
However, despite these differences in the 2014, 2015 and 2016 reports’ discourse,
the EU still presents the same overall positive discourse that One Country, Two Systems
is working fine and that many freedoms have continued to be well exercised. This proves
high levels of discursive consistency across time, as even the most significant political
event in HK’s history could not change the EU’s fundamental discursive message. There
were more discursive strands that consistently reappeared yearly than new strands that
came and went.
To conclude, discourse across time has been remarkably consistent, with the
continued reproduction of various discourses over the last two decades. Even when events
occurred that arguably threatened the political and legal status quo, both the optimism
about One Country, Two Systems’ health and other discursive strands continued.
Furthermore, much of the inconsistency seen in discourse across time is purely a response
to an evolving political situation. In this sense, it would be a criticism towards the EU if
their discourse didn’t change whilst the environment in HK did. Thus, discourse not
remaining entirely uniform across time is not necessarily a negative finding.
Consistency Across Time And Institutions
A common tendency in discourse across both elements is for the EU to promote
the same values in every document, including the rule of law, freedoms, universal
suffrage and the preservation of One Country, Two Systems. This is done to enact an
identity the EU sees itself as having - that of a normative power.
Furthermore, similar discourse strands appear together and overlapping, notably
the preservation of One Country Two Systems being an insurer of the preservation of key
freedoms and values; that the EU cares, is concerned about and takes an interest in HK’s
situation; that dialogue between both the EU and HK and HK and China, is an effective
tool to achieve progress; that the EU is an important actor in HK; that the EU and HK
share common values; and that HK has great strategic importance for EU interests. This
is so much the case that often entire paragraphs are copied from one resolution or report
to the next.
This is reinforced by consistent use throughout all documents, debates and
speeches of intertextuality, a common technique found in EU discourse, which helps the
discourse appear consistent and uniform. There are numerous other examples of
intertextuality, such as reference by other institutions in speeches or press releases to the
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annual report, and continual reference in the annual report and in EEAS documents to
high level visits. All these examples are significant to answering the question of
consistency as intertextuality is an important way the EU maintains consistent discourses
across long time periods.
In addition, consistency across both time and institutions has occurred in how the
EU is adept at using discourse to create the impression it has always called for the same
thing, supported the same goals. For example, using words such as “recall”, “continues”,
“remains”, “always”, “reaffirmation”, “repeatedly”. Almost every time an EU pledge of
support is made, or their relationship with HK is referenced, such words precede this to
underline their consistent position. The EU also sees its own approach to HK as consistent
over time, calling itself so in the reports.
A further example of consistency across time and institutions is in terms of how
HK is perceived by the EU and the identity attributed to it. Examples of descriptions that
reappear include: “unique”, “dynamic”, “diverse”, “free”, a “gateway”, having a
“strategically favourable position in Asia”; “regional hub” and as a “key partner”. The
various descriptions indicate a consistent attitude towards HK, perceiving it as having
two main identity strands: strategic importance and uniqueness. A final example is in the
repetition of discourses portraying the EU’s relationship with HK as continuously
deepening and widening. At no point in time, in any institution, have their relations been
discussed in a negative way.
In conclusion, there are large levels of consistency across both time and
institutions. This trend continues when consistency between actions and words is
examined.
Consistency In Word And Deed
In the Commission’s Communication published just before the handover, they
pledged to do three things: 1. To deal directly with the HK government as an international
partner and maintain regular and close contacts. 2. To closely monitor the situation in HK
and the respect for rights guaranteed to citizens, bringing EU instruments into play if
necessary. 3. To put active cooperation between the two on a more permanent footing.
Whether each pledge has been fulfilled is discussed in turn.
The EU has to a strong extent fulfilled the first. This can be seen by how the pledge
made at the same time to conduct high level visits between the EU and HK has
continuously been fulfilled, the number of visits actually increasing in number and level
of seniority year on year. Further evidence is the setting up, from 2006 onwards, of an
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annual Structured Dialogue between the EU and HK. This happened only a year after a
visit to HK from President Barroso where it was agreed such a dialogue was needed,
showing swift action on discussed recommendations.
With regards to the second pledge, the first element (to closely monitor the
situation) has been fully complied with. The EU has consistently been a keen observer of
HK’s development, evidenced for example by the reliable, detailed explanations of the
political situation or of specific important events in the annual reports. Both Commission
and Parliament discourses show evidence of being attuned to the HK context, providing
great depth and technical details. The EU is well aware of HK people’s concerns and
desires. An illustrative example is in how the Commission mentions Occupy Central as
an example of the emerging groups calling for democracy in the 2013 report before the
movement became particularly well known or the protests occur a year later.
Regarding the second promise, often in an annual report a particularly worrying
development is explained in detail, ending with a line saying the EU will monitor this
situation closely. Virtually every time this happens, there is then a section on updates in
this area in the following report(s). One example of inconsistency is that, sometimes when
an important development occurs, the EU will make a statement or action on it
immediately, yet in other instances they will discuss it in hindsight. The EU does not
always react with the same speed or vigilance.
The second element of the second pledge, concerning the use of all available EU
instruments, has been achieved. Evidence for this commitment being fulfilled is that each
year, there are annual reports produced that demonstrate the EU is keeping a close eye on
the political and legal situation in the region. Further evidence is that, when significant
events occur, all four institutions respond. For example, during the Article 23 saga in
2003 and the Occupy protests in 2014, the EEAS released statements, the Council
released declarations, the Parliament debated and the Commission gave sizeable space in
their annual report to the issue.
Further evidence for the EU sticking to its promise to monitor the situation is in
the Parliament’s resolution on HK published before the handover, they called for the
existing EU delegation office in HK to have its staff and resources increased. Over the
last twenty years, this has happened, with the span of their work increasing annually. Are
all instruments made use of? A wide range are, including dialogues, resolutions,
communications, debates, communiques, high level meetings, diplomatic missions and
cooperation.
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One example of EU inconsistency is that the 1997 Commission communication
promised not only to produce annual reports but also that the Parliament would publish
resolutions biannually on the contents of these. Although this was carried out until 2004,
no resolutions have been published since. In addition, following their pledge in 2014 to
offer more cooperation and support in democratic reform, it is unclear whether the
Commission has offered this over the past four years. There is little mention of it in the
future reports, and the situation in HK regarding electoral reform progress has remained
stagnant.
Concerning the third commitment, this has been fully achieved. Just some
examples of cooperation include: in culture, research, trade and many more. The annual
reports getting longer every year rudimentarily demonstrates cooperation has expanded.
Simply reading each annual report provides ample evidence the pledge to cooperate with
HK has been fulfilled. In addition, a specific area of cooperation pledged by the
Commission from 1997 was for contact and cooperation between the Parliament and the
LegCo to increase. This has indeed happened, with two or three visits per year by MEPs
from the EU-China delegation and vice versa. Arguably, the EU could have gone further
by creating a specific parliamentary delegation to HK.
To conclude, in consistency between words and actions, the EU in fact scores highly.
CONCLUSION
The preceding research aimed to show whether, despite pressures originating from
other actors, the EU could remain consistent in its foreign policy approach towards the
HKSAR. To achieve this, the question How consistent is the EU in promoting democratic
norms in its relations with the HKSAR? was asked. The answer reached, after undertaking
an extensive discourse analysis, is that the EU has, over the last two decades, in fact
demonstrated a high level of uniformity in its action towards HK, in terms of both talk
and action.
As the above analysis revealed, the EU has demonstrated a considerable amount
of consistency in foreign policy towards HK and their democratisation process. This
research attempted to uncover whether the consistency of the EU’s foreign policy
approach may have been affected as a result of the wider context of EU-China relations.
It appears this is largely not the case.
In terms of consistency across time, the EU has remained mostly consistent, any
discursive fluctuation justified by the fact this is to be somewhat expected as a situation
changes. In institutional terms there has been consistency, with the marked exception of
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a stronger discourse originating from the Parliament, as indeed literature predicts.
Discursive consistency is also seen when both time and institutions are analysed together.
Finally, the EU scores highly in terms of following through its words with actions. These
findings reveal that perhaps there is potential for the EU to pursue a consistent and
coherent foreign policy towards China, and that, despite pessimism in the wider literature,
all is not lost. The EU can manage to balance interests and values.
The conclusions drawn can contribute to making conclusions and connections to
the wider puzzle of EU-China relations, a field of research that definitely gives future
research inspiration. Furthermore, the analysis revealed relevant findings about the EU’s
interests regarding HK, its perceptions of HK, and how various discourses draw on and
reinforce others to build and create perceptions. Due to time and space constraints, these
could not be included. When considering EU interests, is the question of preserving HK’s
political autonomy and thus its economic vitality of more pressing concern than the need
to keep the EU in China’s good books? This would make for interesting future research.
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